



(U//FOUO) The Next Frontier for Information Sharing

FROM: [REDACTED]
NSA Representative to the JITF-CT (S113)
Run Date: 09/08/2005

(U//FOUO) NSA and the JITF-CT (Joint Intelligence Task Force - Combating Terrorism - the DoD's center for combating terrorism) move forward with information sharing. (See [DIRgram-311](#): "New DIA/JITF-CT Pilot Program for Access to NSA Databases.")

(C) "The next frontier for information sharing" was the topic of discussion during Cindy Farkus' (SID/Assistant Deputy Director for A&P) visit to JITF-CT on 17 August. Both NSA and JITF-CT have been exploring possibilities to move forward out of the pilot and to institutionalize greater collaboration as well as information sharing.

(C) Mr. Cal Temple, JITF-CT's Office for Intelligence Operations Chief, suggested that in the near-term NSA and JITF-CT consider reducing the scope of the sharing while enhancing the usefulness of what would be shared. He suggested reducing the scope to perhaps a focus on communications externals (metadata), while expanding the number of recipients and **increasing regional breadth of data where available**. Ms. Farkus thought something might be possible and agreed to explore this further.

(U//FOUO) The recently signed [NSA Directive 1-9](#) permits NSA to share more metadata than ever before. Probably the two biggest complications of the congressionally mandated Pilot (see [DIRgram-311](#) for more details) were the:

- extension of SIGINT authorities to JITF-CT analysts, and
- an experimental IT support infrastructure, the feasibility of which then-DIRNSA Gen. Hayden wanted the team to explore.

(U//FOUO) Mr. Temple's suggestion to focus on externals, or metadata, should allow NSA to forego the administrative drain on its resources that would result from extending SIGINT authorities to additional JITF-CT analysts. Since it is expected that the DNI will address the key obstacles to sharing unpublished SIGINT in the next year or so, all agreed that this idea supports both organizations' desire to quickly advance the frontiers of information sharing without expending too much effort to build a work-around to a obstacle that the DNI might soon remove.

(S) The group did a quick "walk-through" of potential obstacles as well as lessons learned from past and current NSA-DIA collaboration efforts. They discussed the need for DIA to help lessen the administrative burden on NSA by developing its own in-house trainers for information sharing and by overseeing the clearance issues and any Oversight issues involved in our next steps forward.

(S) The group discussed how [USSID CR1611\(P\)](#) (formerly USSID 323) permits NSA analysts to share more unpublished SIGINT details with its customers verbally and in e-mail. While noting how very useful this has been for the all-source analysts, both sides noted that the receiving analysts do not always completely understand the sensitivity of the shared details or how to determine with whom they can share the information they received.

(S) All agreed this new openness is likely causing some confusion throughout the Intelligence Community. The NSA Representative for JITF-CT noted that she had begun discussions on this with SID Policy and OPSEC personnel, and that they were exploring the risk-management issues and what further guidance might be provided to NSA's customers.

(U//FOUO) Cindy Farkus noted that NSA had learned a great deal that it will use to guide future collaborative information sharing. "In my opinion, we're beyond the Pilot." She stated that it was

indeed time to move the information sharing efforts out of the ad hoc realm and into the mainstream.

(U//FOUO) Ms. Farkus stated that S2 would take the lead in this next step. With assistance and input from S1 and others, S2 would work with JITF-CT to determine exactly how to make this "next frontier" a reality. She asked [REDACTED], NSA's JITF-CT Rep, to work with JITF-CT to help them capture their ideas and bring them to the table, and to work with the S2 lead to ensure the right players will be brought in at the beginning.

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 ([DL sid comms](#))."

DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108